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ABSTRACT
The paper takes on the increasingly popular view that the service sector should become Malaysia’s new engine of growth, 
given the relative stagnation of its manufacturing sector in the last decade and the rise of post-industrial knowledge 
economy, in which the engines of growth consist of knowledge-intensive services such as finance, engineering, and 
design. The paper begins by explaining why the relative decline of manufacturing, or de-industrialisation, occurs and 
what kinds of negative consequences it may have on a country’s productivity growth and balance of payments. After 
this, the paper makes a number of points criticising the ‘post-industrial knowledge economy’ discourse. First, the 
knowledge economy is nothing new, as it was never the physical act of making things but the quality of the knowledge 
behind production that determined a country’s economic success, even in the industrial era. Second, many knowledge-
intensive services look ‘new’ only because they have been ‘spun off’ or ‘outsourced’ from the manufacturing firms that 
previously produced them. Third, we cannot separate the manufacturing sector from the ‘knowledge’ sector, as it is 
the key source of new productive knowledge. Fourth, most service activities that have high rates of productivity are 
producer services for the manufacturing sector and can therefore be sustained without a successful manufacturing 
sector in the long run. Finally, the present article debunks some myths about the supposed service-based success stories 
of Switzerland, Singapore, and (more recently) India. In the final section, the paper discusses the policy implications for 
Malaysia. While warning against making a fetish out of manufacturing, Malaysia needs to further develop its national 
technological capabilities in manufacturing through sustained investments in machinery, education, training, and R&D, 
supported by better policies regarding government procurement, social welfare, and other areas, in order to become a 
truly developed economy.
ABSTRAK
Kertas ini mengambil kira pandangan yang semakin mendapat perhatian mengenai sektor perkhidmatan yang sewajarnya 
menjadi jentera pembangunan yang baharu bagi Malaysia.  Memandangkan sedekad yang lalu, Malaysia berhadapan 
dengan kelembapan pertumbuhan sektor pembuatan, ditambah pula dengan kemunculan ekonomi pengetahuan 
(k-ekonomi), di mana jentera pembangunan negara beranjak kepada perkhidmatan berbentuk pengetahuan intensif 
seperti kewangan, kejuruteraan, dan reka bentuk. Kertas ini dimulakan dengan menjelaskan alasan mengapa berlakunya 
nyah-perindustrian dalam sektor pembuatan dan apakah kesan negatif yang berlaku yang boleh menjejaskan peningkatan 
produktiviti dan imbangan bayaran negara. Seterusnya, kertas ini mengemukakan beberapa kritikan terhadap wacana 
‘k-ekonomi pasca-perindustrian’ iaitu: Pertama, k-ekonomi bukan sesuatu yang baharu, bahkan kejayaan ekonomi 
sesebuah negara semasa era perindustrian juga sebenarnya ditentukan oleh kualiti pengetahuan.  Kedua, banyak 
perkhidmatan intensif pengetahuan kini sebenarnya kelihatan seperti baharu hanya kerana ia telah melalui proses 
‘pengitaran semula’ atau mendapat ’‘penyumberan luar.’ Ketiga, sektor pembuatan dan pengetahuan tidak boleh 
dipisahkan kerana ia merupakan sumber utama bagi pengetahuan produktif yang baharu. Keempat, kebanyakan aktiviti 
perkhidmatan yang mempunyai kadar produktiviti yang tinggi adalah pembekal perkhidmatan untuk sektor pembuatan, 
justeru dalam jangka masa panjang ia mampu dikekalkan tanpa kehadiran sektor pembuatan. Akhir sekali, kertas ini 
memaparkan beberapa mitos tentang kejayaan firma berasaskan perkhidmatan di Switzerland, Singapura dan mutakhir 
ini, India. Bahagian terakhir, kertas ini membincangkan implikasi dasar bagi Malaysia. Ia mencadangkan untuk menjadi 
sebuah negara ekonomi membangun, kebergantungan kepada sektor pembuatan tidak harus dikurangkan. Kertas ini 
menyarankan agar Malaysia lebih menekankan kepada pembangunan keupayaan teknologi dalam sektor pembuatan 
melalui pelaburan berterusan dalam mesin dan peralatan, pendidikan, latihan dan R&D.  Ini perlulah disokong oleh 
dasar-dasar kerajaan yang lebih baik berkaitan perolehan, kebajikan sosial, dan bidang-bidang lain. 
Keywords: Knowledge-intensive services; Post-industrial knowledge economy; De-industrialisation; New productive 
knowledge; Malaysia’s economy
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INTRODUCTION
Since its independence in 1957, Malaysia has achieved 
an impressive development of its manufacturing sector 
and of its overall economy. Having initially been highly 
dependent on ‘natural’ resources like rubber and tin 
(‘natural’ is use because there is nothing natural about 
rubber, which was stolen and transposed from the 
Amazon by the British), it first diversified into other 
natural resources, like palm oil. While developing some 
manufacturing industries that are derived from its natural 
resource bases, such as the palm oil processing industry, 
Malaysia has also developed many manufacturing 
industries that are not related to it – notably electrical 
and electronics (E&E), as well as the automobile and steel 
industry. 
The share of manufacturing in Malaysia’s gross 
domestic product (GDP) rose from 8.6% in 1960 to 
32.2% in 2005, while the share of manufactured 
goods in total trade has risen from around 25% in the 
early 1980s to around 80% today. As of the late 1990s 
(1998, to be precise), Malaysia was identified as one 
of the few countries that swam against the tide of de-
industrialisation that had swept the developing world 
since the 1980s, despite being very resource-rich (Palma 
2005). Particularly impressive is its success in upgrading 
its exports. UNIDO (2009) reports that Malaysia’s 
manufactured export structure in 1976 “was substantially 
less sophisticated than the level predicted by its income 
per capita”, but that by 2003 “it had achieved one of the 
most sophisticated export structure among developing 
countries, well above the level predicted, based on its 
income”. UNIDO measures the degree of sophistication 
of manufactured exports by the weighted average of 
GDP per capita of all countries exporting the good. The 
weights used are the export intensity of the sector in each 
country (UNIDO 2009: 45). Malaysia is ranked third in 
the world league table of hi-tech exporters, as reported 
by the World Bank – 40% of its manufactured exports 
are hi-tech products (World Bank 2011: 352-3) (Table 5).
As impressive as these achievements appear, they 
leave a lot to be desired. Malaysia has yet to achieve 
international success in its automobile and steel 
industries, which were launched with the ambition to 
create world-class companies. Unlike its more successful 
neighbours, such as Singapore, South Korea (henceforth 
Korea), and Taiwan – which have all achieved a high-
income status – Malaysia still remains an upper-middle-
income economy, with per capita income around $7 000.
The comparison with Korea illustrates what 
Malaysia could have achieved particularly poignantly. 
In the early 1960s, both countries were highly reliant 
on natural resources exports – rubber and tin in the case 
of Malaysia and tungsten and fish in the case of Korea 
– except that Malaysia was much better endowed with 
natural resources and had a per capita income more than 
two-and-half times (2.6 times, to be precise) higher than 
that of Korea – $215 versus Korea’s $82. Five decades 
later, the position has been exactly reversed. In 2009, 
the per capita income of Korea was 2.7 times higher 
($19 830 vs. $7 230), largely thanks to its mastery of 
core technologies and organizational skills, as well as 
brand-building (e.g., Samsung, Hyundai, LG, POSCO) 
in a number of key manufacturing industries, such as 
electronics (semiconductors, mobile phone, display 
screens), shipbuilding, automobile, and steel (the income 
data are from World Bank 2011: 344-345) (Table 1).
Even in the E&E sector, where it has achieved world 
competitiveness in certain market segments, Malaysia 
still relies heavily on foreign companies for core 
technologies, production organization, and branding and 
marketing, thereby not being able to capture the most 
lucrative parts of the value chain (Rasiah 2004; 2010). 
So, despite being the third most hi-tech exporter in the 
world, Malaysia still has a per capita income level of $7 
230, a level that is between 36% (compared to Korea, 
with a $19,830 per capita income and ranked fourth 
on this indicator) and 13% (compared to Switzerland, 
with a $56 370 per capita income and ranked tenth on 
this indicator) of other hi-tech economies (see Table 1 
below). Malaysia’s situation in this regard is much better 
than the Philippines, which, despite being the most hi-
tech economy in the world, has only 3% of the Swiss 
income and only 4% of the US income ($47 240), but 
this is hardly a consolation for a country that is aspiring 
to be a high-income economy within less than a single 
generation.
As seen in the case of Singapore (per capita income 
of $37 220, as of 2009) and Ireland (per capita income 
of $44 310), reliance on foreign companies does not 
necessarily mean a low income if the country is able 
to capture the higher-end activities in the value chain. 
Ireland’s per capita income shrank by around 12% 
between 2006 and 2010, with a bleak prospect for future 
growth, due to its failures with its ‘financial hub’ strategy 
and the consequent collapse of the national economy. 
This is a salutary lesson for Malaysia and other countries 
that want to move away from manufacturing into finance. 
However, this requires that the country offer high-quality 
inputs that other countries cannot offer – such as well-
trained engineers, highly-skilled workers, and high-
quality infrastructure. At the moment, Malaysia is not 
able to offer such inputs and thus can only maintain a 
middle-income status.
More worryingly, Malaysia’s manufacturing sector 
has suffered from relative stagnation in the recent period. 
Having its progress arrested during the Asian financial 
crisis of 1997-98, the share of the manufacturing sector 
as a percentage of the total GDP peaked around 2000 at 
32.6% and has since been on a declining trend, although 
there have been ups and downs. 
In the meantime, China has made giant strides as 
a manufacturing power, attracting large amounts of 
foreign direct investments, some of which could have 
come to Malaysia, and edging middle-income countries, 
like Malaysia, out of many export markets. There is an 
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increasing feeling that Malaysia – being rapidly caught 
up with by China while being unable to catch up with 
the more advanced economies in terms of manufacturing 
technologies, organizational skills, brand-building – 
may now be stuck in the ‘middle income trap’ (Yusuf & 
Nabeshima 2009a, 2009b). 
Ranking and the country 
name
Share of hi-tech exports in 
total manufactured exports 
(%)
Share of manufactured 
exports in total 
merchandise exports (%)
Per capita income
(Gross National Income in 
current US dollars)
1 the Philippines 66% 86% 1,790
2 Singapore 51% 70% 37,220
3 Malaysia 40% 70% 7,230
4 Korea 33% 87% 19,830
5 China 29% 94% 3,590
6 US 27% 67% 47,240
7 Ireland 26% 86% 44,310
8 Thailand 25% 75% 3,760
9 Hungary 24% 80% 12,980
10 Switzerland 23% 90% 56,370
11 the Netherlands 22% 55% 49,350
12 Finland 21% 81% 45,680
13 France 20% 79% 42,680
14 Mexico 19% 76% 8,920
14 UK 19% 72% 41,520
16 Japan 18% 89% 37,870
17 Sweden 16% 76% 48,930
17 Denmark 16% 67% 58,930
17 Israel 16% 94% 25,740
20 Canada 15% 50% 41,170
TABLE 1. Share of manufactured exports and share of hi-tech exports in them (World Bank data,
ordered according to the latter, excluding countries with less than 50% share in the former)
Source: World Bank (2011), Selected Indicators, Table 1 (pp. 344-345) for income figures, Table 5 (pp. 352-3) for export figures.
This has prompted many people to focus on the 
service sector as a new alternative engine of growth 
for Malaysia. Being unable to make further progress in 
manufacturing, in this view, the better alternative for 
Malaysia is to develop its service sector. The fact that 
the service sector is now the largest and fastest growing 
sector in the Malaysian economy – growing at an average 
rate of 6.8% for the past 5 years, compared to the average 
rate of GDP growth of 4.3% for the same time period 
(UNDP data) – adds to the weight of this argument.
This view is further strengthened by the increasingly 
popular discourse of post-industrial knowledge economy. 
According to this discourse, the world has now entered 
a ‘post-industrial’ stage, in which the engine of growth 
is not manufacturing any more but knowledge-intensive 
services, such as finance, engineering, design, marketing, 
logistics, and consultancy. Countries like Switzerland 
and Singapore are presented as the examples of service-
based prosperity. Some even believe that developing 
countries now can, and should, skip industrialization and 
enter the ‘post-industrial’ stage directly. The apparent 
success of services exports by India is frequently cited as 
evidence that this is not only possible but also desirable.
The view that knowledge-intensive services are 
the new engine of growth has become very popular in 
Malaysia too. The Malaysian government has started 
actively promoting the services sector. One key move 
has been the liberalization of 27 services sub-sectors in 
April 2009. 
THE LIMITS OF THE DISCOURSE OF POST-
INDUSTRIAL ECONOMY
The discourse of post-industrialism starts from the 
observation that in the last few decades all rich countries 
have experienced ‘de-industrialisation’ in the sense that 
the shares of manufacturing sector in national output 
and in employment have fallen. So, according to this 
argument, the decline of manufacturing is not only 
something natural that we need not worry about, but 
something that we should really celebrate as a sign of 
development. 
There is a truth in the argument that above a certain 
level of development, countries become ‘post-industrial’, 
or ‘de-industrialised’. However, this is unequivocally the 
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case only in terms of employment. 
It is true that much lower proportions of people 
in the rich countries work in factories than used to be 
the case. For example, in the late 19th and the early 
20th century, in some countries (notably the UK and 
Belgium), around 40% of those employed worked in the 
manufacturing industry. Today, the ratio is at most 25% 
and in some countries (especially the US, Canada, and 
Britain) between 10% and 15%. 
However, even the richest economies have not really 
become post-industrial in terms of their production and 
consumption. In order to see this point, we first need to 
understand why de-industrialisation has happened in the 
rich countries.
A small, but non-negligible, part of de-
industrialisation is due to ‘optical illusions’, in the sense 
that it reflects changes in statistical classification rather 
than changes in real activities. One such illusion is due to 
the outsourcing of some services that used to be provided 
in-house by manufacturing firms and thus were counted 
as manufacturing output (ranging from low-grade 
services, like catering and cleaning, to high-end services, 
like research and design). When these activities are 
outsourced, recorded service outputs increase without 
a real increase in service activities. Even though there 
is no reliable estimate of its magnitude, experts agree 
that outsourcing has been a significant source of de-
industrialisation, at least in the US and the UK, especially 
during the 1980s. 
In addition to the outsourcing effect, the extent of 
manufacturing contraction is exaggerated by what an 
important report by the UK government’s Department 
for Business, Enterprise, and Regulatory Reform (BERR 
2008) calls the ‘reclassification effect’. According to 
BERR (2008), up to 10% of the fall in manufacturing 
employment between 1998 and 2006 in the UK may be 
accounted for by some manufacturing firms, seeing their 
service activities becoming predominant, applying to 
the government statistical agency to be re-classified as 
service firms, even when they are still engaged in some 
manufacturing activities.
One cause of genuine (as opposed to the above-
mentioned ‘illusory’) de-industrialisation has recently 
attracted a lot of attention. It is the rise of manufacturing 
imports from low-cost developing countries, especially 
China. Nevertheless, however dramatic it may appear, 
it is not the main explanation for de-industrialisation in 
the rich countries. Rowthorn and Ramaswamy (1999) 
estimate de-industrialisation (of the rich countries) due 
to such trade to be around 18% for the 1970-94 period, 
while Rowthorn and Coutts (2004) estimates the figure 
to be around 30% for the 1992-2002 period. Bolhoul 
(2004) estimates the figure for 1970-2002, for the OECD, 
to be about 15%.
The prevailing view is that the bulk of de-
industrialisation in the rich countries can be largely 
explained by the natural tendency of the (relative) 
demand for manufactured goods to fall with rising 
prosperity. However, a closer look reveals that this 
demand effect is actually very small. It looks as if we are 
spending ever higher shares of our income on services 
not because we are consuming ever more services in 
absolute terms but mainly because services are becoming 
ever more expensive in relative terms due to the falling 
prices of manufactured goods.
With the (inflation-adjusted) amount of money you 
paid to get a personal computer ten years ago, today you 
can probably buy three, if not four, computers of equal 
or even greater computing power (and certainly smaller 
sizes). As a result, you probably have two computers, 
rather than just one. But even with two computers, the 
portion of your income that you spend on computers has 
gone down quite a lot (for the sake of argument, I am 
assuming that your income, after adjusting for inflation, 
is the same). In contrast, you are probably getting the 
same number of haircuts as you did ten years ago. The 
price of haircuts has probably gone up somewhat, so 
the proportion of your income that goes to your haircut 
is greater than it was 10 years ago. The result is that it 
looks as if you are spending a greater (smaller) portion 
of your income on haircuts (computers) than before, 
but the reality is that you are actually consuming much 
more computers than before, while your consumption of 
haircuts is the same. 
Indeed, if you control for the changes in relative 
prices and measure things in constant prices, the decline 
of manufacturing in the rich countries has been far less 
steep than it appears to be. For example, in the case of the 
UK, the share of manufacturing in total output in current 
prices fell by over 40% between 1955 and 1990 (from 
37% to 21%). However, when taking the relative price 
effects into account, the fall was only by just over 10% 
(from 27% to 24%) (Alford 1997: 6) (Table 1). In other 
words, the real demand effect – that is the demand effect 
after taking relative price changes into account – is small.
The above discussion shows that much of de-
industrialisation actually happens not because of the 
fall in real demand for manufactured products, but 
because of the fall in the relative prices of manufactured 
goods, thanks to the higher productivity growth rates in 
manufacturing industries than in services (this theory 
was first systematically developed by Rowthorn and 
Wells (1987). As the output of the manufacturing sector 
increases faster than the output of the service sector, the 
prices of the manufactured goods relative to those of 
services fall.
In manufacturing, where mechanisation and the use 
of chemical processes are much easier, it is easier to raise 
productivity than in services. In contrast, by their very 
nature, many service activities are inherently impervious 
to productivity increase without diluting the quality of 
the product. 
In some cases, the very increase in productivity 
will destroy the product itself – we wouldn’t say that its 
productivity increased by three times because a string 
quartet has trotted through a 27-minute piece in nine 
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minutes. For some other services, the apparent higher 
productivity is due to the debasement of the product. For 
example, a teacher can raise her apparent productivity 
by four times by having four times many pupils in her 
classroom, but the quality of her ‘product’ has been 
diluted by the fact that she cannot pay as much individual 
attention as before. For another example, a lot of the 
increases in retail service productivity in countries like 
the US and Britain have been brought about by lowering 
the quality of the retail service itself. Productivity 
increases in retail services in these countries have been 
achieved by passing on the costs to the consumers. The 
means used include: the use of fewer shop assistants, 
thereby reducing the wage bill but making customers 
wait longer before they are served and increasing their 
time costs; making the customer use self-service check-
outs, where the customer does the work of the cashier; 
locating stores outside of population centres, thereby 
reducing store rents but forcing the customers to take 
longer shopping journeys, which imposes more time and 
transportation costs on the customers (e.g., more fuel, 
higher bus fares); making stores bigger, thereby reducing 
the logistic costs but forcing the customers to spend 
more time shopping, as they have to walk longer aisles; 
reducing the frequency and the precision of deliveries, 
thereby reducing the transportation costs (as the delivery 
vehicles need to make fewer trips and spend less time 
travelling between delivery points) but forcing the 
customer to spend more time waiting and even skipping 
work, which then imposes costs on the customer and/or 
their employers. To sum up, much of de-industrialisation 
– the fall in the share of manufacturing in total output 
in current prices – can be explained by the faster rate 
of productivity growth in manufacturing, compared to 
services, which leads to the rise in the relative prices of 
services. 
If de-industrialisation is due to the very dynamism 
of a country’s manufacturing sector, isn’t it a good 
thing? Not necessarily. The fact that de-industrialisation 
is mainly caused by the comparative dynamism of the 
manufacturing sector vis-a-vis the service sector does 
not tell us anything about how well it is doing compared 
to its counterparts in other countries. If a country’s 
manufacturing sector has slower productivity growth 
than its counterparts in other countries, it will become 
internationally uncompetitive, leading to balance 
of payments problems in the short run and falling 
standards of living in the long run. In other words, 
de-industrialisation may be accompanied by either 
economic success or failure. Countries should not be 
lulled into a false sense of security by the fact that de-
industrialisation is due to comparative dynamism of the 
manufacturing sector, as even a manufacturing sector 
that is very undynamic by international standards can be 
(and usually is) more dynamic than the service sector of 
the same country.  
Whether or not a country’s manufacturing sector is 
dynamic by international standards, the shrinkage of the 
relative weight of the manufacturing sector has a negative 
impact on productivity growth. As the economy becomes 
dominated by the service sector, where productivity 
growth is slower, productivity growth for the whole 
economy will slow down. Unless we believe (as some 
do) that the countries experiencing de-industrialisation 
are now rich enough not to need more productivity 
growth, productivity slowdown is something that 
countries should get worried about – or at least reconcile 
themselves to.
Moreover, de-industrialisation also has a negative 
effect on a country’s balance of payments because services 
are inherently more difficult to export than manufactured 
goods. This is because, unlike manufactured goods that 
can be shipped anywhere in the world, most services 
require that providers and consumers in close proximity 
to each other. With severe restrictions on immigration, 
the provision of such services simply cannot happen. 
Given this, a rising share of services in an economy 
means that a country, other things being equal, will have 
lower export earnings. Unless the exports of manufactured 
goods rise disproportionately, the country won’t be able 
to pay for the same amount of imports as before. If its 
de-industrialisation is of a negative kind, accompanied 
by weakening international competitiveness, the balance 
of payments problem could be even more serious as 
the manufacturing sector will not be able to increase its 
exports. We will return to this issue later.
HOW ABOUT THE KNOWLEDGE ECONOMY?
But how about the rise of the knowledge economy, 
where ideas are the main source of wealth? Gone are 
the days when services were characterized by low 
productivity growth and low tradability, it is argued, and 
now knowledge-intensive services – such as finance, 
engineering, design, accounting and consultancy – are 
the engines of growth. In such a world, developing 
countries need not industrialise in order to become 
rich. It may even be argued that sticking to outdated 
manufacturing industries is positively harmful for 
economic development in this ‘brave new world’.
Against this, it must be pointed out that the knowledge 
economy is nothing new. We have always lived in one in 
the sense that it has always been a country’s command 
over knowledge (or lack of it) that made it rich (or poor). 
China was the richest country in the world during the first 
millennium because it possessed technical knowledge 
that others did not – paper, movable type, gun powder, 
and the compass being the most famous, but by no means 
the only ones. Britain became the world’s economic 
hegemon in the 19th century because it came to lead 
the world in technological innovation. When Germany 
became as poor as Peru and Mexico after the Second 
World War, no one suggested that it should be reclassified 
as a developing country, because people knew that it still 
had command over technological, organisational, and 
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institutional knowledge that had made it one of the most 
formidable industrial powers before the War.
Moreover, it should be noted that many knowledge-
intensive services (e.g., research, engineering, design) 
have always been there – inside manufacturing firms. 
They look new only because they have been ‘spun 
off’ or ‘outsourced’ from those firms. It is not as if 
manufacturing firms used to engage only in mindless 
physical operations and began using those knowledge-
intensive producer services only recently.
More importantly, it is wrong to separate the 
manufacturing sector from the ‘knowledge’ sector. The 
manufacturing sector itself has been the key source of 
new productive knowledge (see, among many others, 
Rosenberg (1982), Lundvall (1992), and Nelson (1993)). 
First of all, there is a lot of learning-by-doing 
(Arrow 1962) and learning-by-using (Rosenberg 1982) 
in the manufacturing sector. This means that a lot of new 
knowledge is acquired in the actual process of making 
things. Second, insofar as deliberate efforts are made 
to generate new knowledge through R&D, a lot of such 
efforts are generated in the process of solving concrete 
problems arising from production activities in the 
manufacturing sector. This means that little knowledge 
is generated by ‘pure’ knowledge (service) industries. 
Third, the manufacturing sector has a lot more ‘linkages’ 
with other sectors than the service industries (the concept 
of linkages is due to Hirschaman (1958)). Therefore, 
other things being equal, the manufacturing sector 
stimulates more technological progress in other activities 
than does the service sector. 
All of this means that those who believe that 
developing countries don’t need to industrialise and 
develop by jumping directly into the ‘knowledge 
economy’ seriously misunderstand the nature of modern 
economic activities. Given the way in which new 
knowledge is generated – whether deliberately (through 
conscious research and development) or not (through 
learning-by-doing or learning-by-using) – the production 
process in the manufacturing sector is the key source for 
new productive knowledge. Given all this, any attempt to 
de-value the importance of manufacturing on the ground 
that it is knowledge-poor low-grade activity is highly 
misleading.
CAN COUNTRIES ACHIEVE PROSPERITY BY 
SPECIALIZING IN SERVICES?
Of course, there are some service activities – such as 
financial services, research, engineering, design, and 
logistics – which have faster rate of productivity increase 
than other services. However, this does not mean that 
countries can ditch manufacturing and rely on such 
services.
First of all, as revealed by the 2008 financial crisis, 
much of the productivity growth in financial services was 
due not to a real rise in their productivity (e.g., reduction 
in trading costs due to better computers) but to financial 
innovations that obscured (rather than genuinely reduced) 
the riskiness of financial assets, thereby allowing the 
financial sector to grow at an unsustainably rapid rate. 
Moreover, the above-mentioned high productivity-
growth services are mostly ‘producer’ services, for 
which the main customers are manufacturing firms, so 
their growth is in large part dependent on the vitality 
of the manufacturing sector. They are complements of, 
rather than substitutes for, manufacturing activities.
Of course, the interdependence of dynamic services 
and manufacturing does not preclude the possibility that 
individual countries can specialize in those services 
and export them. However, apart from the balance of 
payments problem that such specialization is likely to 
generate (more on this later), a country’s international 
competitiveness in those dynamic services cannot be 
maintained in the long run without a strong manufacturing 
sector within its borders. In services like engineering 
and design, insights gained from the production process 
are crucial. Given this, a weakening manufacturing 
base will eventually lead to a decline in the quality and 
exportability of these services over time. Countries that 
lose production processes will eventually lose design, 
engineering and other producer services.
Apart from all these theoretical considerations, the 
truth of the matter is that, except for very small tax havens 
(e.g., Monaco), there is no country that has attained a 
high standard of living on the basis of services. Against 
this point, many people cite the cases like Switzerland, 
Singapore, and Luxembourg as examples of service-
based prosperity, but this cannot be further from the truth.
As we see from Table 2, Switzerland and Singapore 
are the second and the third most industrialised countries 
in the world respectively, measured by per capita 
manufacturing value added. Luxembourg, while not as 
industrialised as Switzerland and Singapore, is more 
industrialised than the UK (the former ‘workshop of the 
world’) or Taiwan and Korea (today’s manufacturing 
powerhouses).
One more problem with service-based economic 
development is that the increase in the weight of the 
service sector has a negative impact on the country’s 
balance of payments because services are inherently 
more difficult to export as we discussed earlier. 
Balance of payments problems are bad enough 
for rich countries, but they are critical obstacles to the 
progress of developing countries. By definition, these 
countries need to import advanced technologies from the 
technologically more advanced countries – sometimes 
through technological licensing, but mostly through 
the purchase of machines and intermediate goods that 
embody more advanced technologies – and therefore 
restrictions on their ability to import also restrict their 
ability to develop their economies.
Of course, not all services are equally non-tradable. 
The knowledge-based services that I mentioned earlier – 
finance, consulting, engineering, and so on – are highly 
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tradable. For example, in the UK since the 1990s, exports 
of knowledge-based services have played a crucial role 
in plugging the balance of payments gap left behind by 
de-industrialisation (and the fall in North Sea oil exports, 
which had enabled the country – just – to survive the 
negative balance of payments consequences of de-
industrialisation during the 1980s). 
TABLE 2. Manufacturing value added per capita in selected countries, 2005
Country MVA per capita




Japan 8,474 153 1
Switzerland 6,874 124 2
Singapore 6,708 121 3
Ireland 6,590 119 4
Sweden 6,462 117 5
Finland 5,939 107 6
USA 5,528 100 7
Germany 5,179 94 8
Austria 4,786 87 9
Luxembourg 4,496 81 10
Taiwan 4,144 75 11
Canada 4,110 74 12
Iceland 3,960 72 13
Norway 3,953 72 14
Belgium 3,897 70 15
Denmark 3,828 69 16
Korea 3,827 69 17
UK 3,707 67 18
Italy 3,379 61 19





Source: UNIDO (2009), pp. 129-31, Table 1.
Note: *The ranking is provided only for the countries that rank in the top 20 in the UNIDO table. 
However, even in the UK, which is the most successful 
country in the export of knowledge-based services, 
the balance of payments surplus generated by those 
services is well below 4% of GDP, just enough to cover 
the country’s manufacturing trade deficits (Rowthorn & 
Coutts 2004). Moreover, with the likely strengthening 
of global financial regulation as a consequence of the 
current global financial crisis, its exports in finance will 
decrease, making it very difficult for the country can 
maintain the current level of trade surplus in knowledge-
based services in the future.  
In the case of the US, supposedly another model 
post-industrial economy, the trade surplus in knowledge-
based services is actually less than 1% of GDP – nowhere 
near enough to make up for its manufacturing trade 
deficits, which are around 4% of GDP (Rowthorn & 
Coutts 2004). The US has been able to maintain such a 
large manufacturing trade deficit only because it could 
borrow from abroad heavily – an ability that can only 
shrink in the coming years, given the changes in the 
world economy – and not because its service sector 
stepped in to fill the gap, as in the British case. 
Moreover, as we mentioned above, it is questionable 
whether the strengths of the US and Britain, even in the 
knowledge-based services in which they have come to 
specialise, can be maintained over time. Most of these 
services with higher tradability are producer services, 
in which geographical proximity, shared traditions, and 
continued interactions between different stakeholders 
are critical in learning and innovation. This means that a 
continuous shrinkage of a country’s industrial base will 
lead to a decline in the quality of its producer services, 
which will then eventually lead to a fall in international 
competitiveness and thus the loss in export earnings.
Given the reality of service production and trade 
in countries such as the UK and the US, the view that 
developing countries can largely skip industrialisation 
and move directly to the service economy – a view 
particularly popular among some observers of India, the 
self-proclaimed ‘office of the world’ – needs a serious 
re-examination. 
As pointed out earlier, the manufacturing sector 
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has an inherently faster productivity growth than the 
service sector does and, thus, specializing in services 
will mean a slower economic growth. There are some 
services that have high productivity growth, but they 
are mainly producer services that supply manufacturing 
firms, so it is very difficult to develop them without first 
developing a strong manufacturing base, whose absence 
is typically the most important reason why a country is 
not economically developed. 
Even if a developing country somehow develops 
some producer services without industrialisation, 
their international competitiveness is likely to be 
unsustainable, given that its maintenance requires 
continuous interaction with the producer, for which 
geographical proximity and shared traditions are critical. 
Moreover, given that services are much less 
tradable, countries specialising in services are likely to 
face much more serious balance of payments problems 
than countries that specialise in manufacturing. Even 
with the supposed rise of these tradable services, the 
share of services in international trade has been firmly 
stuck at around 19% since the early 1990s (Chang in The 
Economist Debate 2011) suggesting that these services 
may not have exceptionally high tradability, although we 
have to look at the data at a more disaggregated level, 
something which no one has really done, in order to draw 
a definite conclusion in this regard.
Low tradability of services is bad enough for a 
developed country, for which balance of payments 
problems will lower standards of living in the long run. 
However, it is seriously detrimental for a developing 
country. To repeat what we said earlier, a country is 
not developed mainly because it has low-productivity 
technologies and has to import superior technologies 
from abroad if it is to develop economically. Therefore, 
when a developing country has a problem concerning its 
balance of payments, the ability to develop its economy 
is hampered. 
The supposed export success of India’s service 
sector reveals the fantastical nature of the ‘service-
driven development’ discourse. India had a trade deficit 
in services until 2003, so its service export success is 
very recent. But even after that – between 2004 and 2009 
(the latest data available) – India recorded service trade 
surplus equivalent only to 0.9% of GDP, which covered 
only 19% of its manufacturing trade deficit (4.8% of 
GDP) (derived from the UN statistics). This means that 
unless it increases its service trade surplus by 5 times (an 
implausible scenario, given that its service trade surplus 
has not even been on a firm rising trend), India cannot 
maintain its current pace of economic development 
without a serious balance of payments problem.
IMPLICATIONS FOR MALAYSIA
The above discussion suggests that in order to achieve 
a high-income status, Malaysia should develop its 
manufacturing industries further and upgrade them 
to the world class. Of course, Malaysia – or for that 
matter any other country – should not make a fetish out 
of manufacturing. As we have pointed out earlier, the 
Philippines has less than $2,000 income despite being 
the most hi-tech manufacturing economy in the world 
on one indicator. At the other extreme, the Netherlands, 
despite having one of the highest population densities in 
the world and poor climate, is the 3rd largest agricultural 
exporter in the world. These examples show that 
ultimately what matters is not what you produce but 
how you produce it – the Philippines is poor despite its 
manufacturing export success because it does not control 
the technologies it uses, while the Netherlands is one of 
the most successful agricultural producers in the world 
because it has essentially ‘industrialised’ agriculture 
(greenhouses, hydroponic agriculture, computer-
controlled feeding, high quality chemicals).
Nevertheless, it is totally implausible that Malaysia 
can become a high-income economy by abandoning 
the manufacturing sector and radically re-focusing its 
economy towards the service sector, although all of this 
does not preclude Malaysia from developing some high-
end services. 
As Singapore’s experience shows, developing 
the manufacturing sector to a very high level does not 
necessarily mean developing national brand names, as 
Japan or Korea have done. However, it definitely means 
developing national technological capabilities. This, 
in turn, requires sustained investments in machinery, 
education, training, and R&D, supported by better policies 
regarding government procurement, social welfare, and 
other areas.
These investments and supporting policies won’t 
come easy and will take time to bear fruit. However, 
Malaysia’s current strategy, based upon the New 
Economic Model that clearly recognises the need to 
upgrade national productive capabilities, makes one 
cautiously hopeful for the country’s future. However, 
some of the NEM’s detailed policies are questionable. 
First of all, deregulation is proposed as a way to promote 
private sector interest, but this is not right. While it is 
important to promote the private sector, this does not 
mean that less regulation is necessarily better for the 
private sector, not to mention the national economy. 
There are many regulations that actually promote private 
sector development through the prevention of the ‘race 
to the bottom’ (e.g., child labour), the prevention of 
business from seeking short-term gains (e.g., financial 
transactions tax, making M&A more difficult, (again child 
labour), and the prevention of ‘wasteful competition’ (e.g., 
investment coordination) (Chang 1997; 2011). Second, 
the linkages between production and innovation need 
to be emphasised more than at present. As emphasised 
in the text, without productive enterprises, little useful 
innovation will happen, so it is important to establish 
close collaboration between productive enterprises and 
research bodies. Third, the current global financial crisis 
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has exposed the limits of the ‘global standard’ corporate 
governance institutions and financial regulations that the 
NEM wishes to emulate. These need to be re-evaluated.4
NOTE
1 UNIDO measures the degree of sophistication of 
manufactured exports by the weighted average of 
GDP per capita of all countries exporting the good. 
The weights used are the export intensity of the 
sector in each country (UNIDO 2009: 45).
2 However, Ireland’s per capita income shrank by 
around 12% between 2006 and 2010, with a bleak 
prospect for future growth, due to its failures with its 
‘financial hub’ strategy and the consequent collapse 
of the national economy. This is a salutary lesson 
for Malaysia and other countries that want to move 
away from manufacturing into finance.
3 This section draws partly on Chang (2010), chap. 9.
However, some of the NEM’s detailed policies are 
questionable. First of all, deregulation is proposed 
as a way to promote private sector interest, but this 
is not right. While it is important to promote the 
private sector, this does not mean that less regulation 
is necessarily better for the private sector, not to 
mention the national economy. There are many 
regulations that actually promote private sector 
development through the prevention of the ‘race 
to the bottom’ (e.g., child labour), the prevention 
of business from seeking short-term gains (e.g., 
financial transactions tax, making M&A more 
difficult, (again child labour), and the prevention 
of ‘wasteful competition’ (e.g., investment 
coordination) (Chang 1997, 2011: chap. 12). Second, 
the linkages between production and innovation 
need to be emphasised more than at present. 
As emphasised in the text, without productive 
enterprises, little useful innovation will happen, so it 
is important to establish close collaboration between 
productive enterprises and research bodies. Third, 
the current global financial crisis has exposed the 
limits of the ‘global standard’ corporate governance 
institutions and financial regulations that the NEM 
wishes to emulate. These need to be re-evaluated.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT
I am grateful to United Nation Development Programme 
(UNDP) for Malaysia, Singapore, and Brunei Darussalam 
and the Economic Planning Unit (EPU) of Malaysia for 
their supports of this work. I thank Kamal Malhotra 
and Chris Choong Weng Wai for their helpful inputs 
throughout the process of conceptualizing and preparing 
for the paper. I thank Antonio Andreoni, Carlos Lopez-
Gomez, and Veerayooth Kanchoochat for their valuable 
research assistance. I thank the participants in the UNDP-
ISIS Public Lecture on 7 December, 2011, on which this 
paper is based, for their helpful comments.
REFERENCES
Alford, B. 1997. De-industrialisation. ReFRESH, 
Autumn.
Arrow, K. 1962. The economic implications of learning 
by doing. Review of Economic Studies 29(3): 155-
173.
BERR. 2008. Globalisation and the changing UK 
Economy. London: Department for Business 
Enterprise and Regulatory Reform, Her Majesty’s 
London.
Boulhol, H. 2004. Quel impact du commerce international 
sur la désindustrialisation dans les pays de l’OCDE?, 
flash CDC-Ixis capital markets, in Debande, O. 
2006. De-industrialisation, EIB Papers 11(1). 
Chang, H-J. 1997. The economics and politics of 
regulation. Cambridge Journal of Economics 21(6): 
703-728.
Chang, H-J. 2010. 23 Things They Don’t Tell You About 
Capitalism. London: Allen Lane (Penguin).
The Economist. 2011. Debate on manufacturing between 
Ha-Joon Chang and Jagdish Bhagwati, Available at 
http://www.economist.com/debate/overview/207/
Manufacturing
Hirschman, A. 1958. The Strategy of Economic 
Development. New Haven and London: Yale 
University Press.
Lundvall, B-Å, eds. 1992. National Systems of 
Innovation. London: Pinter Publishers. 
Nelson, R., eds. 1993. National Innovation Systems. 
Oxford: Oxford University Press.
National Economic Advisory Council. 2010. New 
Economic Model for Malaysia 2010. Putrajaya: 
Government of Malaysia.
Palma, J. G. 2005. Four sources of de-industrialisation 
and a new concept of the Dutch Disease’. In Beyond 
Reforms, Structural Dynamics and Macroeconomic 
Vulnerability, edited by. Ocampo, J. A. Stanford: 
Stanford University Press.
Rasiah, R. 2004. Exports and technological capabilities: 
a study of foreign and local firms in the electronics 
industry in Malaysia, the Philippines, and Thailand’. 
European Journal of Development Research 16(3): 
141-177.
Rasiah, R. 2010. Are electronics firms in Malaysia 
catching up in the technology ladder? Journal of 
Asia Pacific Economy 15(3): 301-319.
Rosenberg, N. 1982. Inside the Black Box, Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press.
Rowthorn, R. & Coutts, K. 2004. De-industrialisation 
and the balance of payments in advanced economies. 
Cambridge Journal of Economics 28(5): 767-790.
Rowthorn, B. & Ramaswamy, R. 1999. Growth, trade 
and deindustrialisation. IMF Staff Papers 46(1): 
18-41. 
Rowthorn, R. & Wells, J. 1987. Deindustrialisation and 
Foreign Trade. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press.
12 Jurnal Pengurusan 35
World Bank. 2011. World Development Report 2011. 
Washington D.C.: World Bank.
Yusuf, S. & Nabeshima, K. 2009a. Tiger Economies 
under Threat – A Comparative Analysis of 
Malaysia’s Industrial Prospects and Policy Options. 
Washington DC: World Bank.
Yusuf, S. & Nabeshima, K. 2009b. Can Malaysia 
escape the middle-income trap? – a strategy for 
Penang, Policy Research Working Paper no. 4971, 
Washington DC: World Bank.
UNIDO. 2009. Industrial Development Report. Vienna: 
UNIDO (United Nations Industrial Development 
Organization).
Ha-Joon Chang
Faculty of Economics 
University of Cambridge
Sidgwick Avenue, Cambridge CB3 9DD, 
United Kingdom
E-mail: hajoonchang@googlemail.com
